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Problems and Conclusions 
Tunisia at a Crossroads: 
Which Rules for Which Transition? 
Since the fall of the autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
on 14 January 2011, Tunisia is often described as the 
“good student” of the “democratic transition” in the 
Arab world. According to many experts, the country 
that had triggered the popular uprisings in the region 
went on to the next stage: that of the “consolidation of 
democracy.” This positive interpretation became even 
more engrained in that the political changes under-
way since the “Arab revolutions” seemed to oscillate 
between civil war and a return to authoritarianism. 
In fact, compared to Libya, where fragmentation and 
the privatization of violence have stood in the way of 
establishing any type of political order, and to Egypt, 
where the overthrow, by the army, of the first demo-
cratically elected civilian president precipitated the 
country into a downward spiral of repression and 
violence, Tunisia presents itself as the “only hope” 
remaining from the so-called Arab Spring. Combined, 
these factors appear to work like a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in the sense that the democratic transition 
in Tunisia is invariably seen as having been success-
fully accomplished. However, according to another 
interpretation of events, diametrically opposed to 
the latter, a “religious counter-revolution” has been 
underway since the Ennahda Movement has arrived 
in power. According to this view, the attempts of the 
Islamist party to “constitutionalize the sharia,” to 
“criminalize blasphemy” and to establish “the role 
of women as ‘complementary’ to men,” constitute 
the realization of the objectives advocated by political 
Islam. The two readings, as opposed as they are, never-
theless share certain aspects in common, namely 
teleology and determinism. 
Unless we consider the homicides of the opponents 
Lotfi Naguedh in October 2012, Chokri Belaid in Feb-
ruary 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013 as peri-
pheral events, the political process at work in Tunisia 
since the founding elections of 23 October 2011 is 
even more complex than suggested by the two above-
mentioned interpretations. By exposing the uncom-
pleted and uncertain dynamics underway since the 
Constituent Assembly elections, this study seeks to 
depict the ambivalence and fragility of the Tunisian 
transition. Shedding doubt on the commonly recog-
nized reports, this article intends to explore questions 
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6 
that have been examined little or not at all to date: 
Who governs what transition? To what degree are 
the post-authoritarian institutions really democratic? 
To which scenarios might the transition lead? 
By examining this little explored problem, this 
study, based on a field survey, arrived at the following 
conclusions: 
 Contrary to what is conveyed by the acclaimed 
narrative of an “alliance between moderate Islam-
ists and moderate secularists,” the sharing of power 
is very unequal because Ennahda is pulling the 
strings of government. 
 The deliberate extension of the mandate of the 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA), elected on 
23 October 2011 to draft a constitution within one 
year, as well as the refusal to this day of the ruling 
party to commit to a road map and a binding elec-
toral calendar, have ended up leaving the country 
in a crisis of the interim institutions. 
 A detailed analysis of this crisis reveals a situation 
that, while eclipsed by the established paradigms, is 
essentially more complex: the preeminence of the 
de facto institutions over the de jure institutions. This 
means that it is less the prime minister than the 
president of the ruling party who governs, and that 
it is more the consultative council of the Ennahda 
party, wielding extra-institutional veto power, than 
the NCA that deliberates. 
 While the political opening has rendered state 
repression more difficult, the militia groups pro-
tected by Ennahda now resemble an informal 
instrument of repression. 
 The political regime adopted by the draft consti-
tution, in addition to the fact that it does not set 
conditions for the independence of the judiciary, 
contains the drawbacks of the parliamentary as 
well as the presidential systems: ruling-party 
hegemony, government volatility, institutional 
deadlock, presidentialism. 
 The impunity of the militias, the institutional 
weakness of the Independent Board of Elections, 
known by its French acronym ISIE, and the Draft 
Law on Political Exclusion together comprise an 
institutional environment that reveals itself to be 
closer to “competitive authoritarian” regimes 
than to democratic systems. 
 Tunisia finds itself at a crossroads. Three scenarios 
unfold before it: instability, which may result in a 
new popular uprising, in authoritarianism or in 
a transition; emergence of a hybrid regime (neither 
truly democratic nor entirely authoritarian); and 
democratization. 
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Introduction: Which paradigm for which transition? 
 
Two prevailing interpretations, contesting each other, 
exist on the political reshuffling underway in Tunisia 
since the elections of the National Constituent Assem-
bly (NCA) of 23 October 2011. One assures that the 
country has already “succeeded” its “democratic 
transition,”1 and the other affirms that a “religious 
counter-revolution” has taken root since the accession 
to power of Ennahda.2
Uncompleted and uncertain, the dynamics at work 
in Tunisia since the founding elections raise impor-
tant questions: Who governs what transition? To 
what degree are post-authoritarian institutions really 
democratic? Which institutional arrangements are 
emerging from the process of the current political 
transition? 
 However, the political process 
in Tunisia is not as clear-cut as either of the accounts 
portrays it to be. From the government alliance 
between Islamists and seculars to ruling-party hegem-
ony, from an engaged civil society to police brutality, 
from the abandonment of the constitutionalization of 
the sharia to the politicization of mosques, from the 
successful fight for civil liberties to the trivialization 
of excommunication (takfir) of opponents, from media 
pluralism to the mass firings of judges, from the re-
balancing of the political forces to the impunity of the 
militias, and from the institutionalization of conflict 
to political homicide – the elements that impede the 
analysis of the political process in Tunisia are count-
less. The symbolism is all too apparent: Once the new 
Tunisian leaders arrived in Sidi Bouzid – where the 
self-immolation by fire of the famous Tarek (called 
Mohamed) Bouazizi had triggered a popular uprising 
– to celebrate the second anniversary of the fall of the 
autocrat Ben Ali, they saw themselves forced to flee 
the sites of the ceremony under a hail of stones flung 
by a crowd infuriated by what it considered to be a 
“confiscation of the revolution.” 
Transitology, by now an established field of study, 
quickly imposed itself as the paradigm for the inter-
pretation of the Arab Spring. Based on archetypal 
 
1  Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Toler-
ations,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 2, no. 23 (April 2012): 89–90. 
2  John Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How the Islamists Hijacked 
the Middle East Revolts (New York, 2012). 
patterns generated by Spain and Portugal, transitology 
tends to fail to differentiate between transitions from 
authoritarianism and those leading to democracy. In 
other words, it fails to recognize that the collapse of 
an authoritarian government is one thing and the con-
struction of a democratic regime another. The teleol-
ogy of democratization, at the root of this merging 
of concepts, moreover fails to account for the fact 
that non-democratic systems, such as authoritarian 
or hybrid regimes, often emerge as an outcome of a 
“transition.” In fact, of the 85 transitions that took 
place between 1974, when the “third wave of democ-
ratization” began, and the end of the Cold War, 34 
new authoritarian regimes have emerged.3 In addi-
tion, between the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the 
dawn of the Arab Spring, 33 regimes that are neither 
fully democratic nor entirely authoritarian have come 
into existence throughout the world.4 A third factor 
puts strain on the dominant trends of transitology: 
the belief that constitutional rules determine, as in 
stable democracies, political trajectories.5
The application of transitology to the Arab world 
in general and Tunisia in particular does not appear 
 Based on 
the assumption that formal institutions govern the 
action of political actors during transitions, these 
studies lose sight of the informal institutions and 
rules of the game. Yet, in many cases, the latter prove 
to be more significant than the statutory procedures, 
to the extent that political practices can circumvent, 
neutralize or manipulate formal institutions. In such 
contexts, the political outcomes pertain less to 
constitutional engineering than to the organization of 
power and the resources available to the rulers. 
 
3  Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democrati-
zation after Twenty Years?,” Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (1999): 115–44 (116). 
4  Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritar-
ianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge, 2010), 3. 
5  Juan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” Journal of Democ-
racy, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990): 51–69; Alfred Stepan and Cindy 
Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consoli-
dation: Parliamentarianism Versus Presidentialism,” World 
Politics, vol. 1, no. 46 (October, 1993): 1–22; The Failure of Presi-
dential Democracy, ed. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Balti-
more, 1994); Steven Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger 
Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 17 (2006): 5–20. 
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8 
to be exempted from these challenges. Two principal 
factors underpin and perpetuate these difficulties. 
First there is the enthusiasm for the Arab Spring trig-
gered by the simultaneous fall of the autocrats Ben Ali 
and Mubarak, an exuberance that sometimes amounts 
to no more than wishful thinking. The second factor 
concerns the disillusion provoked by the Libyan, 
Syrian, Egyptian, Yemenite and Bahraini trajectories. 
Compared to these countries, which oscillate between 
authoritarianism and civil war, Tunisia is pursuing a 
process that does in fact appear to be more promising. 
Combined, these two factors function like a self-ful-
filling prophecy in the sense that the democratic 
transition in Tunisia is invariably seen as having 
been successfully accomplished. The article by Alfred 
Stepan published in the April 2012 edition of the 
Journal of Democracy is characteristic of this approach. 
The author affirms that “[i]n 2011, Tunisia achieved 
a successful democratic transition, albeit not yet a 
consolidation of democracy.”6
The global spread of hybrid regimes in the wake of 
the third wave of democratization should incite us to 
more epistemological vigilance. Having mushroomed 
in the wake of the Cold War, these systems of govern-
ment are neither fully democratic nor entirely author-
itarian.
 
7 The approach adopted in this study, avoiding 
the teleology and determinism of transitology, is to 
evaluate the impacts of the institutions together with 
those of the processes.8 Focused on the institutional 
arrangements at work, it will examine the following: 
the rules of the political game; the organization of 
power; the spread of the conflict beyond a winner-
loser dichotomy; the dynamics of tension; and the 
relations between the de jure and the de facto institu-
tions. The study is based on a field survey that gave 
priority to immersion, in-depth interviews, partici-
pant observation and primary data.9
 
 
 
 
6  Cf. footnote no. 1. 
7  Cf. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (see note 
4); Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 2, no. 13 (2002): 36–50. 
8  I refer to the theoretical framework of historical institu-
tionalism and draw in particular on: Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and 
Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge, 2009); Paul Pierson, Politics in 
Time: History, Institutions, and Social Change (Princeton, 2004); 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis, ed. Steinmo Sven et al. (Cambridge, 1992). 
9  The field survey was conducted from December 2012 
through February 2013. 
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Who governs? 
 
Ten months after the ousting of the autocrat Ben Ali, 
Tunisia held the first free and democratic elections in 
its history. On 23 October 2011, the constituents were 
asked to elect the 217 members of the NCA mandated 
to draft, within the period of one year, a new consti-
tution for the country. Supervised by the ISIE10 – an 
independent board of elections set up by the so-called 
Ben Achour Commission11 – these founding elections 
had the following results: the Islamist Ennahda party 
won 41.01% of the seats, with 36.97% of the votes; 
the heterogeneous Congrès pour la République (CPR)12
Government coalition or 
ruling-party hegemony? 
 
won 13.36% of the seats, with 8.7% of the votes; the 
secular socialist party Ettakatol obtained 9.22% of 
the seats, with 7.04% of the votes; the populist-conser-
vative party Popular Petition (also Aridha Chaabia or 
Al Aridha) gained 11.98% of the seats, with 6.92% of 
the votes; and lastly, the left-of-center Progressive 
Democratic Party won 7.37% of the seats, with 3.96% 
of the votes. The remaining seats were shared by a 
myriad of small left-wing and independent parties. 
The predominant interpretation emphasizes the 
innovative character of the government coalition 
established between the “moderate Islamists” and the 
“moderate seculars.” Yet, what exactly is this coalition 
about? The Ennahda Movement, due to the party-list 
proportional representation (largest remainder sys-
tem) introduced by the Ben Achour Commission, 
obtained only a relative majority and was thus not 
 
10  The ISIE is directed by Kamel Jendoubi, an opponent 
from the left in the former regime and a militant defender 
of human rights. 
11  High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary 
Goals (Haute instance de réalisation des objectifs de la révo-
lution), chaired by the professor for public law Yadh Ben 
Achour. 
12  The direction of the CPR was then ideologically hetero-
geneous, composed of secularists (such as Moncef Marzouki 
and the intellectual Marxist-leaning Aziz Krichen), Nasserian 
nationalists (such as Amor Chetoui), elements close to Islam-
ism (following the example of Imed Daimi and Slim Ben 
Hamidene) and Islamists (such as Abderraouf Ayadi). 
able to govern alone. This constraint obliged the 
Islamist party, the president of which is Sheikh 
Rached Ghannouchi, to form a troika with the hetero-
geneous CPR of Moncef Marzouki and the left-wing 
secularist formation Ettakatol of Mustapha Ben Jaafar. 
The compromise, the premises of which were revealed 
well before the elections, was concluded very rapidly: 
the position of prime minister was assigned to Hama-
di Jebali, until then Secretary General of the Ennahda 
Movement; that of president of the republic to Moncef 
Marzouki, founder of the CPR; and that of president of 
the NCA to Ben Jaafar, Secretary General of Ettakatol. 
This distribution of roles between “moderate Islam-
ists” and “moderate seculars,” which structures the 
acclaimed account, is deceptive in that it deflects from 
the actual organization of power. For example, the 
Law on the Provisional Organization of the Public 
Powers, adopted on 16 December 2011,13 more than 
one month after the agreement between Ghannouchi, 
Marzouki and Ben Jaafar, runs counter to the estab-
lished account. This law, in the negotiation of which 
Ennahda “has shown itself to be absolutely inflexible” 
according to a spokesperson of the CPR,14
Yet that is not all. While the interim period was 
limited de jure to the drafting of the constitution 
within a delay of one year, “the provisional organiza-
tion of the public powers” granted from the outset an 
unlimited mandate to the NCA. This raises the first main 
question: Why did the NCA, dominated by the Troika, 
refuse to set a time limit of the interim period in the 
mini-Constitution if its main actors, such as Ennahda 
 is of crucial 
importance. Qualified in Tunisia as the “mini-Consti-
tution,” it grants few prerogatives to the allies of the 
dominant party, being the President of the Republic 
and President of the NCA. We shall return to this topic 
later. 
 
13  The Law on the Provisional Organization of the Public 
Powers is available on the official website of the Constituent 
Assembly: http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/organisation_ 
provisoire_des_pouvoirs_publics_tunisie.jsp (accessed August 
5, 2013). 
14  Interview with Amor Chetoui, deputy, negotiator and 
member of the political bureau of the CPR, Tunis, January 
2013. Chetoui is also President of the Constitutional Com-
mittee on Legislative and Executive Powers. 
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and Ettakatol, had duly signed the famous Déclaration 
du processus transitoire initiated by Ben Achour in Sep-
tember 2011,15
The mini-Constitution saw for a clear distribution 
of responsibilities for the respective ministries. This 
distribution offers a good understanding of the orga-
nization of power in a transition that has not seen 
any considerable institutional reform. Essentially, the 
“palace revolution” that precipitated the ousting of 
Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 had neutralized the revo-
lutionary thrust and thereby delayed the implementa-
tion of fundamental changes to the crucial structures 
of the authoritarian system. In that context, Ennahda 
brought its full weight to bear in order to gain control 
over the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Justice, which had been the backbone of the former 
authoritarian regime
 which fixed the duration of the Con-
stituent Assembly to twelve months (at the end of 
which general elections were to take place to elect 
a parliament and form a government)? 
16 and which had not under-
gone institutional reforms after the breakdown of 
the authoritarian regime.17
 
15  The CPR, which called for an interim period of three 
years, refused to sign this document. Read the article on 
the “Déclaration du processus transitoire” on http://www. 
tunisiawatch.com/?p=4331 (accessed August 5, 2013). 
 The issue of control over 
the power apparatuses is all the more important 
as the distribution of ministerial portfolios was 
founded neither on a political pact nor on a common 
agenda uniting the three members of the Troika. 
Moreover, in a political statement addressing the 
16  Cf. Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser, Le syndrome autori-
taire. Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali (Paris, 2003); 
Clement Henry Moore, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent: Money 
and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey (Gaines-
ville, 1996); Béatrice Hibou, La force de l’obéissance (Paris, 2006). 
17  The government of Hamadi Jebali formed on 22 December 
2011 saw for the following distribution: the Ministries of 
the Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Tran-
sitional Justice, Higher Education, Agriculture, Public Health, 
Transport, and Equipment, as well as the State Secretariat for 
Arab and African Affairs fell into the hands of Ennahda; the 
Ministries of State Property, Women, and Professional Train-
ing, the Vice Minister for the Administrative Reform, the 
Secretary of State with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respon-
sible for Asia and America, and the Secretary of State for 
Youth are relegated to the CPR; the Ministries of Social 
Affairs, Education, and Tourism, the Secretaries of State for 
the Reform, and European Affairs and the Vice Minister for 
Governance and the Fight Against Corruption to Ettakatol; 
lastly, responsibility for the Ministries of Defense, Finances, 
Culture, and Religious Affairs was given to non-partisan 
figures. Ennahda quickly gained control of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs. 
deputies of the NCA, released on 28 January 2013, 
then-Prime Minister Jebali recognized that “[t]he 
Troika resembles neighborliness more than a coali-
tion.” The chief of the executive expressed, after 
14 months in office, the urgency of creating a non-
partisan government, citing the following reasons: 
the difficulties, in the interim phase, of governing 
with a coalition yet without an alliance in the Con-
stituent Assembly; the weak coordination among the 
members of the Troika with regard to the taking of 
positions and appointments; and the precipitated 
entry of some members into an electoral campaign.18
The ruling party, which negotiates with each of its 
two partners individually,
 
19 proved to be a formidable 
tactician. It began by conceding, very soon after the 
2011 elections, the presidency of the republic and of 
the NCA to its two secular allies Marzouki and Ben 
Jaafar;20 then it appropriated, in addition to the presi-
dency of the government, so-called ministères de souve-
raineté, in particular the Ministries of the Interior, of 
Justice and of Foreign Affairs;21 stripped the tenant 
of Carthage Palace22
As shown a posteriori by the institutional crisis of 
February 2013, Marzouki and Ben Jaafar, two leaders 
enjoying international renown, have not been able to 
transform the unique value that their alliance with 
the Islamist Ennahda party represents into a more 
equitable sharing of power. The CPR and Ettakatol 
also suffered the loss of senior party officials who had 
 from the reigns of power; and 
weighed down the Assembly with rules of proce-
dure that were to the advantage of the ruling party. 
Ennahda also obtained strategic mandates in the 
NCA, such as the position of General Rapporteur of 
the Constitution and the chairmanship of the consti-
tutional committees on the “Preamble, Fundamental 
Principles and Constitutional Reform,” “Rights and 
Liberties,” and “General Legislation.” 
 
18  Republic of Tunisia/Presidency of the Government, 
Mémoire politique pour un nouveau pacte politique, Tunis, 
January 28, 2013, p. 3. 
19  Interviews with deputies of the CPR, Ettakatol and 
Ennahda, Tunis, December 2012 to January 2013. 
20  The latter two fought over the same position: that of 
the presidency of the republic. 
21  The Ministry of Defense, which hardly represented any 
weight in the authoritarian arsenal of the former regime, 
was accorded to the independent candidate who occupied 
this position in the preceding government. The Ministry of 
Finances was attributed to an economist close of the main 
trade union UGTT; who then resigned six months after the 
forming of the government. 
22  Seat of the presidency of the republic. 
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become disgruntled. For example, CRP, ideologically 
heterogeneous, very soon experienced a split of a 
fringe faction of its high-ranking officials, who went 
on to create a new party, Wafa, which was able to win 
over ten dissident deputies. Somewhat more gradual, 
the crisis that hit Ettakatol eventually emptied its 
parliamentary group by half of its deputies.23
The observation that the CPR and Ettakatol each 
made too many compromises with the powerful 
Ennahda Movement is shared by many, including 
senior party officials who remained loyal to the leader-
ship of their party
 
24 as well as the upper echelon of 
the CPR and Ettakatol. In fact, President Marzouki was 
the first to speak publicly of “Ennahda’s policy of 
infiltrating the state machinery,” first in August and 
again in December 2012.25 Khalil Zaouia, Minister 
of Social Affairs as well as founding member and 
Director of Ettakatol, supported this stance, accusing 
Ennahda of wanting to “control the wheels of the 
state.”26 The same applies to then-Prime Minister 
Jebali, who had implicitly endorsed this stance by 
advocating for the formation of a non-partisan govern-
ment as the only means of “appeasing the political 
climate and to meet the institutional conditions for 
the success of a free and fair election.”27
Last but not least, 87% of the appointments effected 
by the government between December 2012 and Feb-
ruary 2013 across all positions and ministries, from 
the corps of governors to parks and forestry and the 
security apparatus, were done so on a partisan basis. 
 We shall 
return to this point later. 
 
23  Interviews with three dissident deputies from Ettakatol: 
Dr. Salma Mabrouk, Selim Ben Abdesselam, Ali Bechrifa, 
Tunis, January 2013. 
24  Interview with Chetoui, deputy, member of the political 
office and former president of the parliamentary group of the 
CPR, Tunis, January 2013. Interview with Lobna Jéribi, deputy 
and member of the political office of Ettakatol, Tunis, Jan-
uary 2013. The latter adds, however, that the PDP of Nejib 
Chebbi, by refusing to enter into the government, weakened 
Ettakatol. The argument fails to convince, because Ettakatol 
never concluded an electoral alliance with the PDP. 
25  Nicolas Fauque, “Le président tunisien tire à boulets 
rouges sur ses alliés islamistes,” LeMonde.fr, August 24, 2012. 
26  “Tunisie – Khalil Zaouia accuse Ennahdha de vouloir ‘con-
trôler les rouages de l’Etat’,” Businessnews.com, November 
25, 2012, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Khalil-
Zaouia-accuse-Ennahdha-de-vouloir-«contrôler-les-rouages-de-
l’Etat»,520,34741,3 (accessed August 5, 2013). 
27  Address of Prime Minister Jebali broadcast on radio on 
February 6, 2013. 
Of those 87%, 93% were connected to Ennahda.28 In 
fact, during the institutional crisis of February 2013, 
the party in power rejected the proposal made by the 
opposition and by Ettakatol of forming, with the view 
to ensuring partisan neutrality of the public admin-
istration, a committee of independent experts man-
dated to reexamine the appointments made by the 
government. This categorical refusal of the ruling 
party strengthened the assertions of President Mar-
zouki and Khalil Zaouia, Minister of Social Affairs, 
on the subject of “the infiltration of Ennahda in the 
wheels of the administration.” In a situation such as 
that of Tunisia, where the administration had been, 
in the former regime, commingled with the ruling 
party and where the post-authoritarian transition has 
yet to bring about significant institutional reforms, 
the question of the politicization of the bureaucracy 
takes on central importance. This is because it con-
cerns the equality (or not) among the competitors in 
the political arena, which, far from being secondary, is 
a basic tenet of democracy.29
 
 The very imbalanced dis-
tribution of power between the members of the Troika 
tends to be ignored by advocates of the notion that Tu-
nisia has already “successfully accomplished its demo-
cratic transition.” Thus, the quest for hegemony by 
the Ennahda Movement is overshadowed by the mis-
leading account of a “government coalition between 
moderate Islamists and moderate secularists.” 
 
 
28  Lilia Weslaty, “Nominations dans le secteur public: 87% 
pour la troïka dont 93% en faveur des partisans d’Ennahdha,” 
Nawaat.org, http://nawaat.org/portail/2013/03/22/93-des-
appointments-dans-le-secteur-public-ont-beneficie-a-des-
partisans-dennahdha/ (accessed August 5, 2013). 
29  Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (see note 4). 
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Lost in transition? 
 
To achieve its hegemonic objectives, Ennahda played 
a shell game that consisted of passing the interim 
period off as an electoral mandate. In so doing, the 
party in power ended up provoking a negative effect: 
the crisis of the interim institutions. 
The crisis of the interim institutions 
The non-completion, by the NCA, of the drafting of the 
constitution within the one-year mandate, as well as 
the absence of a road map and of a binding electoral 
calendar, threw Tunisia into an acute institutional 
crisis. Essentially, the NCA saw its legitimacy chal-
lenged due to its failure to complete the draft of the 
new constitution by 23 October 2012. The interim gov-
ernment, for its part, could no longer claim to have 
electoral legitimacy with the NCA having come to its 
term. 
Anticipating this crisis, the Tunisian General 
Labour Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, 
UGTT), which has played a major role in contemporary 
Tunisia since the anti-colonial movement,30 convened 
the ambitious National Dialogue Conference on 16 
October 2012. The Union, which had protected many 
fringes of the opposition during the period of authori-
tarianism, intended to bring together actors from 
the political class and from civil society to overcome 
the crisis of the interim institutions. The union leader-
ship, elected after the revolution, summarized the 
principal axes of a consensus to be developed as fol-
lows: 1) reach an agreement on the type of political 
regime; 2) accelerate the implementation of the ISIE;31
 
30  Héla Yousfi, “Ce syndicat qui incarne l’opposition tuni-
sienne,” Le Monde diplomatique, November 2012, http://www. 
monde-diplomatique.fr/2012/11/YOUSFI/48348 (accessed 
August 5, 2013). 
 
3) set a timetable for the completion of the constitu-
tion and for the holding of general elections; and 4) 
set up an independent judicial body and an indepen-
31  The interim government soon announced the end of the 
mission of the independent interim body for control of elec-
tions, the ISIE, in view of implementing a new organization. 
We shall return to this point in the third section. 
dent high commission to regulate the media.32 Thus 
defined, the national dialogue platform provided by 
the UGTT was able to bring together the principal 
actors of the political class and of civil society, from 
Ettakatol to Nidaa Tounes33 and the Popular Front.34 
The President of the NCA, the Prime Minister and the 
President of the Republic, present at the opening of 
the Conference each gave a speech. However, two 
political parties refused to attend the National Dia-
logue Conference: Ennahda and the CPR.35 The two 
allies justified their refusal to participate in the dia-
logue by the presence of Nidaa Tounes, the opposi-
tion movement created by the former interim prime 
minister Beji Caid Essebsi. The latter was perceived 
by Ennahda President Ghannouchi as an actor “more 
dangerous than the Salafists.”36
 
32  Read the interview of Hocine Abassi, Secretary General 
of the UGTT, in: Le Temps, October 15, 2012. 
 However, the expla-
nation put forth by Ennahda and its partner from the 
CPR failed to convince as, six months later, the two 
allies attended another national dialogue, organized 
by the President of the Republic, at which Nidaa 
Tounes was present, all the while their opinion of 
their political adversary had remained unchanged. 
In reality, the refusal of Ennahda and its partner to 
join the National Dialogue Conference was motivated, 
33  Nidaa Tounes is a political party from the center founded 
in June 2012 by Beji Caid Essebsi, who was interim prime 
minister from March 2011 to the elections of the Constituent 
Assembly. 
34  The Popular Front is a coalition of leftist formations and 
progressive nationalist parties formed in October 2012 
under the impetus of Hamma Hammami and Chokri Belaid. 
35  “Ennahdha et le CPR boycottent l’Initiative de 
l’UGTT,” Direct Info, October 15, 2012, http://directinfo. 
webmanagercenter.com/2012/10/15/tunisie-politique-
ennahdha-et-le-cpr-boycottent-linitiative-de-lugtt/ (accessed 
August 5, 2013). The boycott of the National Dialogue Con-
ference of the UGTT advocated by the Ennahda leadership 
despite the participation, at the opening session, of then-
Prime Minister Jebali, was the precursor of the division that 
traversed the ruling party and which became apparent in 
February 2013. 
36  Declaration by Ghannouchi on 04.10.2012 on radio Shems 
FM. Watch the podcast on this link: http://www.businessnews. 
com.tn/Rached-Ghannouchi-Nidaa-Tounes-est-plus-dangereux-
que-les-salafistes,520,33811,3 (accessed August 5, 2013). 
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as later became clear in the institutional crisis of 
February 2013, by other reasons: The participation 
of the government party at the National Dialogue 
Conference would have been tantamount to endorsing 
a new dynamic that would have led to a transition 
from an electoral “legitimacy” to a “procedural con-
sensus,”37 followed by a loss of control of the political 
process. Moreover, the absence of Ennahda and the 
CPR impeded the development of a consensus on the 
rules and procedures of the political transition. Then, 
one day before the conference, the publication by 
the Troika of a road map, although forgotten imme-
diately thereafter, functioned to eclipse any alterna-
tive approaches that were in the making. The refusal 
of Ennahda and the CPR to work toward a procedural 
consensus was not new. Prior, the two allies had 
resigned from the Ben Achour Commission, thereby 
subverting the effort of the president of the High Com-
mission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals to 
form a pact for the democratic transition before the 
founding elections.38
The line of action by Ennahda, although having 
nipped in the bud the plan proposed by the UGTT for 
overcoming the crisis, did not solve the problem. Also, 
the Troika government, constrained by its institution-
al lifespan, was simultaneously challenged with social 
issues. What was entirely foreseeable against the back-
drop of the state’s fiscal crisis became reality: the dif-
ficulty of the interim government to revive economic 
growth, to control inflation and to reduce the extreme 
impoverishment of the interior regions of the country 
ended up exacerbating the discontent of those left 
behind. Also, the disadvantaged regions of the hinter-
land, bastions of the Tunisian revolution, became 
the drivers of social movements. Siliana, an isolated 
village in the center of the country, is the most tragic 
example thereof. The interim government responded 
with harsh repression to a protest movement that 
formed in late November 2011 against the governor, 
installed by the Islamist ruling party. The use of 
rubber bullets by the police against demonstrators 
as well as non-protesting citizens injured nearly 300 
 
 
37  The “procedural consensus” concerns the “rules of the 
game or the procedures” and constitutes for Giovanni Sartori 
a fundamental condition of democratization. The “proce-
dural consensus” does not exclude disagreement on the “ulti-
mate values” or the “public policies.” Cf. Giovanni Sartori, 
The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part One: The Contemporary 
Debate (London, 1987), 90–91. 
38  Interview with Yadh Ben Achour, Tunis, December 2012. 
people and left many blind.39
The President of the Republic, in conflict over pre-
rogatives with the Prime Minister from the very first 
months of the government, came out of his reserve. 
In a powerful speech, the former human rights activist 
condemned police repression and appointments on 
the basis of party affiliation, and called for the forma-
tion of a “restrained government composed of na-
tional non-partisan competencies” in view of ensuring 
the neutrality of the administration and of organizing 
elections before the summer of 2013.
 This police brutality, 
echoing the practices of the former regime, then 
raised a wave of indignation. Moreover, the ferocity of 
the repression of the social movement of Siliana led to 
increased criticism not only against the Troika govern-
ment but also, or rather, against Ennahda, which con-
trolled the Ministry of the Interior. 
40 The leadership 
of Ennahda, seeking to suppress the initiative of its 
unpredictable ally, then found a scapegoat in Chokri 
Belaid, the charismatic leader of the Popular Front. In 
that effort, then-Minister of the Interior Ali Larayedh 
designated Belaid as “the instigator” of the “unrest” 
of Siliana,41
 
39  Read the summary of the inquiry report mandated by 
the Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES), the 
Ligue tunisienne des droits de l’Homme (FTDH) and the Syndicat 
national des journalistes tunisiens (SNJT): Sana Sbouaï, “Répres-
sion à Siliana: Le rapport de la commission accable les forces 
de l’ordre,” Nawaat.org, March 20, 2013, http://nawaat.org/ 
portail/2013/03/20/repression-a-siliana-le-rapport-de-la-
commission-accable-les-forces-de-lordre/ (August 5, 2013). 
Read also the witness account of the reporter of the news 
channel France24, injured by 40 gun bullets while he cov-
ered the events of Siliana: “Blessé à Siliana, David Thomson 
témoigne: ‘la police a tiré aveuglément’,” France 24, Decem-
ber 3, 2012, http://www.france24.com/fr/20121203-tunisie-
journaliste-france-24-david-thomson-doit-vivre-40-balles-
plomb-jambes (August 5, 2013). 
 while the influential member of the 
Ennahda leadership, Habib Ellouze, took on vigorous-
ly and in one fell swoop the UGTT, Nidaa Tounes and 
the Popular Front, accusing them of “paying the 
demonstrators.” The virulent deputy ordered Belaid 
to “remain silent” and threatened the lawyer who had 
defended the leaders of the 2008 protest movement in 
the Gafsa mining basin to disclose the files on his pur-
ported collaboration with the political police of Ben 
40  “Discours de Moncef Marzouki (video),” Direct Info, 
December 1, 2012, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/ 
2012/12/01/tunisie-violences-a-siliana-discours-de-moncef-
marzouki-video/ (August 5, 2013). 
41  Belaid was in Morocco at the time of the events. 
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Ali.42 The Wahhabi preacher Bechir Ben Hassen, for 
his part, whose proximity to the radical wing of the 
ruling party was publicly known, qualified any oppo-
nent of the Ennahda government as “apostate.”43
In addition, the political environment deteriorated 
ostensibly: preachings threatening with the excom-
munication of certain figures from the left were fol-
lowed, all with impunity, by acts of violence perpe-
trated against the opposition parties by a militia 
called the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution 
(LPR).
 
44 In that context, a call for murder was declared 
by a zealous preacher from Zarziz against the oppo-
nents Belaid and Nejib Chebbi.45 As well, on 18 Octo-
ber 2012, the LPR assassinated Lotfi Naguedh, Regional 
Coordinator of Nidaa Tounes and Secretary General 
of the Union of Farmers in the south of Tunisia. This 
crime, taking place two days after the National Dia-
logue Conference organized by the UGTT, marked 
the first public appearance of the LPR. The violence 
escalated even more with the LPR-orchestrated attack 
on the seat of the UGTT on 4 December 2012 – day of 
the 60th anniversary of the assassination, by La Main 
Rouge, of Farhat Hached, founder of the union and 
flagship figure of the Tunisian national movement. 
Further, at the press conference held the day after 
this event, Ghannouchi congratulated the LPR for em-
bodying the “living conscience of the revolution” and 
denounced the UGTT for “left-wing radicalism.”46
The crisis of the interim institutions led not only to 
an impasse for the transition, it also threw the coun-
 
 
42  Declaration made on radio Mosaïque FM on November 29, 
2012. The video can be viewed at: https://www.facebook.com/ 
photo.php?v=516552168394938 (accessed August 5, 2013). 
43  The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=jc_JAx77fQs (accessed August 5, 2013). 
44  The LPR were formed in October 2012 at the beginning of 
the crisis of the interim institutions. Protected by Ennahda, 
they are engaged in a sustained and violent fight against the 
opponents of the government party as well as independent 
journalists. Although similar in name, the LPR differ from 
the “Comités de protection de la révolution” created the day 
after the fall of the autocrat Ben Ali essentially to defend the 
neighborhoods from snipers and other militia let loose by 
the former regime. The Comités de protection de la révolu-
tion, who fought militantly to impose the election of a con-
stituant assembly, dissolved on their own account. 
45  See the video on: http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/video-
tunisie-quand-les-salafistes-reclamaient-la-tete-de-chokri-
belaid-06-02-2013-1624599_24.php (accessed August 12, 2013). 
46  Frida Dahmani, “Tunisie: ces milices qui vous veulent 
du bien,” Jeune Afrique, January 28, 2013, http://www. 
jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2715p040-043.xml1/ (accessed 
August 5, 2013). 
try into disarray, as shown by the hegemony of the 
ruling party, the absence of an electoral calendar, the 
excommunication of opponents and the impunity 
of the militias. The gray zone created by this disarray 
could well serve as a breeding ground for a hybrid 
regime. 
The defeat of the non-partisan government, 
or the preeminence of the de facto 
institutions over the de jure institutions 
The crisis of the interim institutions revealed a fact 
that, although often eschewed by the misleading 
reading offered by transitology, is of crucial impor-
tance in the institutional construction of the new 
political regime: the preeminence of the de facto insti-
tutions over the de jure institutions. In that respect, 
an examination of the power struggle between then-
Prime Minister Jebali and Ennahda over the formation 
of a non-partisan government in February 2013, con-
stituting a major moment of political crisis, provides 
insight into the predominant rationale at work within 
the Tunisian political transition. 
The political changes which Tunisia underwent 
since the election of the Constituent Assembly are 
better understood in terms of how the conflict is dis-
tributed between radicals and moderates than a sim-
plistic winner-loser dichotomy. The divide between 
the radicals and moderates, less ideological than 
political, is defined by greater intransigence on the 
part of the radicals (with regard to the quest for and 
maintenance of power) and a greater ability on the 
part of the moderates to negotiate a procedural com-
promise with their adversaries. Moreover, shaped 
more by structure than circumstance, this problem 
spares no party, not even the party in power. 
In fact, it is within the party in power that the two 
wings, one radical, the other moderate, confront each 
other. The radical wing, well represented within the 
executive office of the party,47
 
47  The members of the executive office of Ennahda are 
elected by the hundred members who compose the move-
ment’s consultative council. The latter, referred to as the 
Shura Council, were elected at the movement’s conference 
held in the summer of 2012. 
 includes Ghannouchi 
(President of Ennahda), Ameur Larayedh (bureau head 
and brother of Ali Larayedh), Fathi Ayadi (President of 
Ennahda’s consultative council – the Shura Council – 
and deputy), Ellouze (deputy and interface with the 
fundamentalist circle of influence), Mohamed Ben 
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Salem (Minister of Agriculture), Noureddine Bhiri 
(then-Minister of Justice) and Sahbi Atig (head of 
the Ennahda bloc at the NCA). The moderate wing, 
considerably less powerful and structured, is repre-
sented by Jebali (then-Prime Minister, Secretary Gen-
eral of Ennahda), Abdelfettah Mourou (Vice President 
of Ennahda) and Samir Dilou (Minister of Human 
Rights and Transitional Justice). 
The divide between the radicals and moderates of 
Ennahda has less to do with fundamental values than 
the rules of the political game. The radicals, who cling 
to electoral legitimacy to continue governing beyond 
the initial term of the interim period, envision tackl-
ing the crisis primarily through the co-option of new 
parties into government. The moderates, by contrast, 
believe that only a national consensus on the road 
map and electoral calendar would allow achieving 
this goal. The radicals, who are holding the strings of 
power, conducted negotiations with different parties 
with the goal of expanding the partisan base of the 
government. However, plans for a cabinet reshuffle, 
announced as imminent since fall 2012, fizzled out, 
achieving neither to integrate the main formations 
of the opposition (such as Al Jomhouri, which on 29 
January 2013 sealed a coalition with Nidaa Tounes and 
the social-democratic Al-Massar party) nor to restore 
the Troika, with Ettakatol moderates increasingly 
imposing as a sine qua no condition to their staying 
in government the entrusting of the departments of 
sovereignty to non-partisan political figures. 
Cornered, the hardliners maneuvered to present 
the Draft Law on the Political Immunization of the 
Revolution48
 
48  The bill tabled by 71 deputies contains 11 articles ex-
plained on 4 pages; it can be viewed on the official website 
of the ANC: http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/projets/ 
projets.jsp?n=85&a=2012 (accessed August 5, 2013). 
 on 29 November 2012, less than one 
month after former interim prime minister Essebsi 
had urged the government and the NCA to build a 
consensual legitimacy in order to prevent an “end of 
electoral legitimacy.” The proposed draft law aimed 
specifically to exclude from the electoral competition 
certain senior officials of Nidaa Tounes who had held 
positions in the former regime. The debate on the 
political exclusion bill, taking place not in the Consti-
tutional Committee on Rights and Liberties but in the 
Constitutional Committee on General Legislation, was 
all the more controversial in that it intended to pre-
empt two draft laws on transitional justice. One had 
been submitted on 2 August 2012 by Nadia Chaabane, 
an elected official of Al-Massar,49 and the other one on 
11 January 2013 by Samir Dilou, Minister of Human 
Rights and Transitional Justice50 and a moderate in-
tellectual of Ennahda who is against “exclusion and 
vengeance.”51 Moreover, the scheduling of the debate 
on this draft law for 1 February 201352
One document, which went unnoticed despite 
its significant relevance, revealed the extent of the 
divergences that oppose the two wings of Ennahda, 
both with regard to the perception of the crisis and 
their proposed means for resolving it: the Memorandum 
for a New Political Pact.
 was controver-
sial as well in that the rules of procedure of the NCA 
accord priority to government draft laws. 
53
 
49  See the document on http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/ 
docs/projets/projets.jsp?n=47&a=2012 (accessed August 12, 
2013). 
 The document of fifteen pages, 
distributed by the prime minister’s office to the mem-
bers of the NCA on 28 January 2013, presents the 
road map of the then-prime minister. This road map 
showed itself to have more similarities with the plat-
form of the October 2012 National Dialogue Confer-
ence than with the party line of Ennahda. The new 
political pact advocated by the then chief of govern-
ment was based on the observation that the Troika 
was politically weak, both with regard to the govern-
ment and the NCA; that the democratic transition was 
too slow; and that the state apparatus was bloated on 
both the right and left. The complexity, stakes and 
demands of this constituent phase required, according 
to Jebali, provoking a “psychological shock” in order 
to raise awareness for the urgent need to establish a 
new political base composed of political and social 
forces, both within and outside the NCA, around a 
political pact or consensus on the architecture of the 
transition. The then-Prime Minister and Secretary 
General of Ennahda defined the principles that should 
guide this procedural consensus as follows: the guar-
50  The Draft Law on Transitional Justice, developed in con-
sultation with international organizations and civil society 
associations, contains 8 chapters and 76 articles, spread over 
15 pages. The bill submitted on 16.01.2013 can be viewed on 
the official website of the ANC: http://www.anc.tn/site/main/ 
AR/docs/projets/projets.jsp?n=12&a=2013 (accessed August 5, 
2013). 
51  Interview with Dilou, Minister of Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice, Tunis, February 7, 2013. 
52  Direct observation, the author having attended the 
meeting. 
53  Tunisian Republic/Presidency of the Government, 
Le mémoire politique pour un pacte politique nouveau, January 26, 
2013 (in Arabic). Document given to the author by the con-
stituent Chetoui. 
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antee of the civil character of the state; a non-partisan 
cabinet; the preservation of the state’s monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force and the prohibi-
tion of militias; the neutrality of the administration 
and the adoption of an effective participatory pro-
cedure concerning appointments.54
Ennahda, which had confirmed its intention to 
harness Jebali by creating the position of “general 
coordinator of the government”
 The new govern-
ment, restricted and dedicated to achieving a “balance 
between the political and the technocratic,” should 
focus on the following priorities: ensuring the safety 
of citizens; controlling inflation; and holding free, fair 
and transparent elections within the shortest time 
possible under the auspices of the ISIE and the super-
vision of national and international organizations. 
Finally, in an effort to achieve the democratic tran-
sition, Jebali sought to develop the ministerial 
reshuffling into a major turning point. 
55 in early 2013, un-
leashed a hail of arrows against the prime minister. 
In the crossfire, the ultimate move was made by 
Ghannouchi, President of Ennahda, in person. The 
latter, portrayed in the party’s press service as sys-
tematically taking the opposite stance of Jebali in 
order to influence the Shura Council, affirmed: “The 
ministerial reshuffle is neither a historical event nor 
a constituent operation […] In the absence of a final 
agreement on the reshuffle, the work will proceed 
with the current government and there is no need to 
solicit a vote of confidence from the National Constituent 
Assembly. The continuance of this government until 
the holding of elections will in no way create a 
crisis.”56
The breaking point between the Prime Minister and 
the Ennahda hardliners appears to have been reached 
at the meeting of the party’s Shura Council on 1 Feb-
ruary 2013. Little before joining the conclave, Jebali 
had reaffirmed to the press that “a ministerial reshuf-
 The Prime Minister, who intended to conduct 
the ministerial reshuffle himself, on the basis of his 
prerogatives, was then called to order by the president 
of the ruling party as follows: “The men in charge of 
Ennahda are all bound by the decision of the internal 
majority at the haraka [movement].” 
 
54  Ibid., p. 9. 
55  Cf. Kaouthar Zentour, “Entrevue d’Ellouze,” Le Maghreb, 
January 9, 2013, p. 4. This position was supposed to, accord-
ing to the directing influence of Ennahda, be confided to 
Ben Salem, Minister of Agriculture and one of the principal 
hardliners of the party. 
56  Read: Faïza Ennaçar, “Entrevue de Rached Ghannouchi,” 
Al Fajr, February 1, 2013, p. 6. Our italics. 
fle falls strictly under the competence of the prime 
minister”;57
The test of strength between the radicals of the 
Ennahda Movement and Jebali turned into a zero-sum 
game: the radicals, who categorically rejected the road 
map of the Prime Minister, could not remove him 
from his functions of chief of the executive; and Jebali, 
hoisted to head of government thanks to Ennahda, 
could no longer count on the support of the majority 
party. This blockage paradoxically favored the emer-
gence of a new political dynamic. Before the gravity 
of the institutional and political crisis in which the 
country found itself, the moderate Ettakatol party of 
NCA President Ben Jaafar, as well as the President of 
the Republic Marzouki, both knowledgeable about 
the inner workings of the ministerial reshuffle, rushed 
to support the Prime Minister. In a message addressed 
to the leadership of the CPR on 2 February, the resident 
of Carthage Palace went so far as to threaten to resign 
should Jebali leave office.
 yet, the final press release of the Shura 
Council called on the “Ennahda Movement and its 
associates to accelerate the settling of the ministerial 
reshuffle.” Bearing the imprint of the hardline par-
tisans, the press release from the leadership of the 
government party called for “an end of the injustice 
inflicted upon the prisoners of the LPR and the 
Ennahda Movement in the [assassination of Naguedh] 
Tataouine affair.” 
58 The moderates of the oppo-
sition followed suit. For example, Nidaa Tounes Presi-
dent Essebsi, whose former minister of the interior 
had served as an advisor to Jebali, considered that the 
“memorandum of the Prime Minister contained inter-
esting ideas.”59 The spokesperson of Al-Massar, deputy 
Samir Taieb, also welcomed the approach of Jebali.60
 
57  Ziyad Krichen, “Le remaniement ministériel explose les 
contradictions à l’intérieur d’Ennahdha,” Le Maghreb, Feb-
ruary 2, 2013, p. 4. 
 
Finally, Popular Front leader Belaid, who considered 
the press release of the Ennahda Shura Council on the 
subject of the crime of Tataouine as a “call to murder,” 
declared on 5 February on a broadly televised show 
that “the violence perpetrated by the LPR militias is 
58  Hocine Al Ayyadi, “In a letter to the national council of 
the party CPR: Marzouki announces that he would resign if 
Jebali quit” (in Arabic), Le Maghreb, February 3, 2013, p. 5. 
59  Interview with Essebsi, Tunis, February 3, 2013. 
60  Interview, Tunis, February 4, 2013. 
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not only targeting the opposition but also Prime 
Minister Jebali.”61
A meeting of the Ennahda executive office held 
on 3 February then marked a true turning point: 
the Prime Minister, far from giving up, decided on 
the contrary to circumvent his party. The very next 
morning, be began organizing political consultations, 
receiving representatives of the UGTT as well as the 
management and the governor of the Central Bank 
of Tunisia. As confirmed by the respected daily Le 
Maghreb from 4 and 5 February, the Prime Minister 
was about to form a “government of technocrats.” 
However, a major disruption was to block the emer-
gence of this alternative process: the murder at point-
blank range of Chokri Belaid, leader of the Popular 
Front, in the early morning of 6 February, upon leav-
ing his home in Tunis, by two assassins who have 
not been caught to this day. The assassination of the 
opponent was not only done “professionally,” shown 
by both its modus operandi and its logistical organiza-
tion, it was also political: the charismatic Belaid, who 
had only the day before his assassination called for the 
holding of a national congress against violence, had 
been pleading since the October 2012 National Dia-
logue Conference for the formation of a non-partisan 
government.
 
62 Moreover, as someone who had worked 
in favor of a rapprochement between the Popular 
Front and Nidaa Tounes,63 his death was felt as a loss 
not only by the left but also by Tunisian political 
society as a whole. To then-Prime Minister Jebali there 
was no doubt: “Those who committed this assassina-
tion are not amateurs. There’s a whole apparatus 
behind it, with a strategy. It is very much a political 
assassination that goes beyond the person of Belaid […] 
We must brace ourselves for some very severe reper-
cussions.”64 Indeed, the murder of left-wing opposition 
leader Belaid had the impact of a political earthquake; 
terrifying, the event plunged the country into a state 
of shock.65
 
61  View the entire intervention of Belaid on Nessma TV 
from February 5, 2013 on this link: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=XqTXh6TF6Wk (accessed August 5, 2013). 
 People were visibly moved, the demons of 
the political divide were stirred up, and memories 
62  Watch the video at: http://www.dailymotion.com/ 
video/xw663r_klem-ennes-chokri-belaid-23-12-2012_news#. 
UcmovpWT3Uo (accessed August 26, 2013). 
63  Belaid maintained longstanding and privileged links with 
Mohsen Marzouk, an intellectual from the left and important 
member of the Nidaa Tounes leadership. 
64  Interview with Prime Minister Jebali in Le Monde, February 
12, 2013. 
65  Participant observation. 
from the recent history of the Algerian neighbor sur-
faced. This invariably raised the dreaded question: Is 
Tunisia on the verge of a civil war? 
Then-Prime Minister Jebali held an address to the 
nation the same evening of the tragedy. Estimating 
the gravity of, to quote him, the “historical moment” 
and the “dangers that threaten the homeland,” he 
publicly announced the project he had been preparing 
for some time: the formation of a non-partisan govern-
ment that would be limited to the fight against pover-
ty and the organization, within a very short delay, 
of democratic elections under international surveil-
lance.66 The success of this plan, he specified, rested 
on two conditions: the massive support of the political 
parties and the organizations; and a united stance 
against those who perpetrate violence. He also called 
on the members of the NCA to support the formation 
of a new government, to finish the drafting of the con-
stitution and to produce a definitive electoral calen-
dar. The initiative of then-Prime Minister Jebali, which 
very much resembled what left-wing opposition leader 
Belaid had called for on the day before his homicide, 
was favorably welcomed by most segments of the 
political class and civil society: from President Mar-
zouki, NCA President Ben Jaafar, to Minister of 
Defense Abdelkrim Zbidi and the famous General 
Rachid Ammar, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
from the Troika party Ettakatol to the opposition 
parties Nidaa Tounes of Essebsi and Al Joumhouri of 
Chebbi; from the powerful UGTT to the influential 
employers’ organization UTICA (Union tunisienne de 
l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat); from Ben 
Achour to Muslim reformer (and former founder of 
the Tunisian Islamist movement) Hmida Ennaifer. 
Opinion polls confirmed this approval. One conducted 
on 12 to 14 February shows that 87% of Tunisians were 
informed about the political initiative of Jebali.67
 
66  View the entire intervention of Prime Minister Jebali 
from February 6, 2013 at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
YGg7gtdQxpM (accessed August 12, 2013). 
 The 
survey reports that 73% of respondents were favorable 
to the prime minister’s project of forming a non-
partisan government after the homicide of Belaid. 
Based on party affiliation, the support for the initia-
tive was as follows: 87% of Nidaa Tounes adherents, 
76% of Popular Front adherents and 65% of Ennahda 
67  Institute 3C Etudes, “Baromètre politique 3C Etudes,” 
February 27, 2013, http://blog.3cetudes.com/2013/02/27/ 
barometre-politique-3c-etudes-14eme-vague-fevrier-2013/ 
(accessed August 5, 2013). 
Lost in transition? 
SWP Berlin 
Tunisia at a Crossroads 
August 2013 
 
 
 
18 
adherents.68 Finally, Tunisia’s principal partners, 
namely France, the European Union and the United 
States, denounced the homicide of Belaid and mani-
fested enthusiastic support for the initiative of then-
Prime Minister Jebali.69
Strengthened by this dynamic the chief of the exec-
utive initiated discussions with the political parties 
in view of reaching a general agreement on the for-
mation of a non-partisan government. Demonstrating 
his approach, he set up a council of elders that in-
cluded national figures from diverse backgrounds, 
such as the social-democratic Ahmed Mestiri, the 
unionist Mustapha Filali, the Chief of Staff Ammar, 
the lawyer Ben Achour, the historian Abdeljalil 
Temimi, the Islamic scholar Hichem Djait, the phi-
losopher Abou Yaareb Marzouki and the Muslim 
reformers Ennaifer and Mourou. 
 
However, despite the great national and inter-
national support for the project of forming a non-
partisan government, the Ennahda leadership, intent 
on maintaining its control of the (interim) govern-
ment, threatened with its veto and endeavored to ruin 
the initiative. For the hardliners of the government 
party and their allies from the CPR, the crisis triggered 
by the assassination of Belaid was yet another demon-
stration of the need for an enlarged government, 
which is what they had been staunchly advocating 
since the beginning of the institutional crisis. A par-
ticularly fierce power struggle then unfolded between 
the two wings, moderate and radical, of Ennahda to 
determine the means for achieving the political tran-
sition in Tunisia. In order to sabotage the formation 
of a non-partisan government, the hardliners endeav-
ored, as per the directive issued by Ennahda President 
Ghannouchi in the party’s press service on 1 February, 
to circumvent the NCA. Nevertheless, despite the con-
trol exercised by the radicals over the bloc of elected 
officials, some twenty constituents of Ennahda were 
ready to vote in favor of the non-partisan government 
of Jebali.70
While the funeral of Belaid, spontaneously mobiliz-
ing hundreds of thousands of people throughout the 
national territory, began to resemble an anti-Ennahda 
plebiscite,
 
71
 
68  Ibid. 
 Ellouze, the leading Ennahda hardliner, 
called for a mass demonstration (milyûniyya) in Tunis 
for 16 February. Convoys of buses coming from all 
69  Al Chorouk, February 21, 2013. 
70  Interview with an anonymous constituent and member of 
the Ennahda Shura Council. 
71  Direct observation. 
governorates of the country brought nearly 16,000 
demonstrators to the nation’s capital, according to 
figures from the Ministry of the Interior.72
Jebali, intent on avoiding a split within his party, 
ultimately handled the situation like a technocrat. 
Dissuaded by the counter-demonstration of 16 Feb-
ruary, he abstained from asking the NCA for a vote of 
confidence on the project of a non-partisan govern-
ment and to thereby provoke a general debate on 
the political crisis. The power play of the hardline 
partisans reached its first objective – declared by 
Ghannouchi several days before Jebali’s call for the 
formation of a non-partisan office – of preventing de 
facto the chief of the executive to exercise his de jure 
prerogative of forming a government and of circum-
venting the NCA. The extra-institutional veto achieved 
by the hardliners thus revealed the preeminence of 
the de facto institutions over the de jure institutions. 
By virtue of this informal but nevertheless significant 
rule of the game, it was less the NCA than Ennahda’s 
Shura Council that held the power of control and 
deliberation; and, in the context of this non-demo-
cratic system, it was less the Prime Minister, elected, 
than the President of Ennahda, not elected by popular 
vote, who really governed. 
 From 
the Salafist preacher Ben Hassen to the Minister of 
Women’s Affairs Sihem Badi of the CPR and the 
hardliners of Ennahda’s Shura Council, the spectrum 
of radicals was well represented. The show of force was 
crowned with a powerful speech held by Ghannouchi. 
Omitting to mention Belaid, the president of the 
Ennahda Movement struck the final blow to the prime 
minister by comparing the initiative of the “govern-
ment of technocrats” to a putsch (inqilâb). Thus the die 
was cast. 
Jebali, who announced the failure of his initiative 
on 19 February, nevertheless did not shut the door. 
Gauging his new popularity, he imposed the following 
conditions for its revival: forming a “government at 
the service of all Tunisians”; initiating an “inclusive 
national dialogue”; fixing a “clear and precise agenda 
for elections”; and “refusing that organizations or 
leagues can replace the state, which should be the 
only authority for the safety and liberty of Tunisi-
 
72  Frida Dahmani, “Tunisie: Rached Ghannouchi, le dis-
cours d’un chef,” Jeune Afrique, February 17, 2013, http://www. 
jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130217125739/ 
(accessed August 5, 2013). 
The defeat of the non-partisan government 
SWP Berlin 
Tunisia at a Crossroads 
August 2013 
 
 
 
19 
ans.”73 The party in power did not wait long to give 
its verdict. The following day, Ennahda’s parliamen-
tary leader Atig announced: “If Jebali adopts the vision 
of the Movement, he will be called on to form a new 
government.”74
Some two weeks later, on 5 March, the interim 
government was faced with the unexpected resigna-
tion of Minister of Defense Zbidi, who cited as reasons 
the absence of a clear political agenda.
 Thus, although Jebali had abandoned 
the idea of forming a non-partisan government, he 
was nevertheless thanked by the hardliners. This 
raises a question that had not been voiced: For what 
reasons did the radicals deprive themselves of the 
services of a head of government who had become, 
in this difficult phase for the party and the country, 
the object of a nationwide consensus? The minimum 
conditions imposed by Jebali in his address of 19 Feb-
ruary shed light on this enigma: the hardline par-
tisans not only rejected the idea of a non-partisan 
government, they also rejected Jebali’s motion for 
distancing the government from partisan tugs-of-war, 
for the organization of an inclusive national dialogue, 
for the dissolution of the militias and for the develop-
ment of a precise agenda. 
75 Thus, the 
refusal of the ruling party to commit to a road map 
and to adopt an electoral calendar did not put 
Ennahda’s vision of the “transition” in a good light. 
A discussion held by Ghannouchi with Salafists in 
his office in April 2012, and filmed without his 
knowledge, reveals aspects of this vision: According 
to Ghannouchi, despite the fact that Ennahda was 
the ruling party, the secular elites were still in control 
of the administration, the economy and the media; 
and, gaining control over these sectors would require 
patience and pragmatism.76
 
73  View the intervention of Jebali from 19 February 2013 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-QlsjbqTJM (accessed 
August 26, 2013). 
 The political practice 
of the party governing the Tunisian transition was 
described by the philosopher Abou Yaareb Marzouki, 
elected to the NCA from an Ennahda list and advisor 
to then-Prime Minister Jebali, as follows: Although 
the context clearly calls for a “liberation of the state 
from political monopolization” and the “prevention 
74  Le Maghreb, February 20, 2013. 
75  The video can be viewed at: http://www.tuniscope.com/ 
index.php/article/22324/actualites/politique/zbidi-demission-
gouvernement-365121#.Ucm2YJWT3Uo (accessed August 5, 
2013). 
76  The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=U_2VbocEHYI (accessed August 26, 2013). 
of the politicization of the administration,” the 
leaders of Ennahda conceive the government and 
its apparatuses and administration as something to 
be “plundered.”77
President Marzouki, who, in compliance with 
Article 15 of the mini-Constitution, has the right to 
hold consultations with political parties and parlia-
mentary groups in view of assigning the mandate of 
forming a new government to a candidate other than 
that of the party that gained the most votes, preferred, 
once again, to entrust the arbitration to Ennahda. 
After having driven out the moderate Jebali from the 
presidency of the government, the ruling party’s 
Shura Council focused on choosing a new prime 
minister. Meeting behind closed doors on 16 and 17 
February, the conclave of Ennahda discussed their list 
of candidates. These included Mohamed Ben Salem 
(Minister of Agriculture), Noureddine Bhiri (Minister 
of Justice) and Ali Larayedh (Minister of the Interior), 
all of whom were members of the executive office 
of Ennahda. All three opposed the former prime 
minister, even Larayedh, known to be close to Jebali. 
Although the Shura Council did not publicize the 
results of their vote, it transpired that Bhiri came in 
first.
 
78 However, after some push and pull between 
the Ennahda leadership and its political partners, the 
former decided to appoint Ali Larayedh, who purport-
edly came in third in the vote by the “parliament” of 
the party. As a revenge, Bhiri, the minister of justice 
who had dismissed 74 judges, began agitating against 
Larayedh within the political class. For example, al-
though he did not publicly dispute Larayedh’s election 
by the “parliament” of the Ennahda Movement, he 
implicitly discredited the election result by expressing 
himself as follows in an interview with the daily news-
paper Al Chourouk: “Ali Larayedh was chosen after con-
sultations with our partners in power and the consul-
tations within the Shura Council […].”79
 
77  Read the resignation letter of Abou Yaareb Marzouki 
on the website of Radio tunisienne: http://www. 
radiotunisienne.tn. 
 Prime 
Minister Larayedh was also notified by the de facto 
general coordinator of the new government in person 
that any prime minister from now on was more than 
ever dependent on the leadership of the ruling party, 
an institution enjoying (extra-) institutional veto 
power. 
78  Interview with an anonymous member of the Ennahda 
Shura Council. 
79  Al Chourouk, February 13, 2013. 
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Thus, the challenge which the ruling party then 
faced was: Which government for which transition? 
Although abandoned, the initiative of a non-partisan 
government left a legacy that revealed itself to be an 
obstacle for the radicals. This obstacle consisted of the 
fact that the moderates of the opposition, as those of 
the Troika, will no longer be ready to engage in a coali-
tion with the Islamist party below a certain threshold 
of conditions after Jebali had proposed a non-partisan 
government. The President of the NCA, Ben Jaafar of 
Ettakatol, who knew that time was playing against 
Ennahda and that the latter could not make do with 
a fragmented and compromised CPR, established the 
“neutrality of the departments of sovereignty” and 
the “reexamination of the administrative appoint-
ments effected by the preceding government” as sine 
qua non conditions for the maintenance of his secular 
party in the Troika. After long and arduous negotia-
tions, the Ennahda leadership, aware that the forma-
tion of a government of radicals would be untenable 
at the national level and disastrous for its internation-
al image, ceded on the first point and accepted the 
agreement. The Larayedh government was finally 
formed on 11 March 2013, after two long weeks, being 
the legal delay granted by the mini-Constitution. The 
only notable change was that the departments of sov-
ereignty were entrusted to so-called “independent” 
figures: the Ministry of the Interior to the judge Lotfi 
Ben Jeddou; the Ministry of Justice to the lawyer 
Nadir Ben Ammou, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to the diplomat Othmane Jerandi, and the Ministry 
of Defense to Rachid Sabbagh. However it remained 
unclear what room to maneuver these ministers 
would have. Would Ben Jeddou and Ben Ammou 
manage to shed light on the homicide of Belaid, fight 
against the militias and assert themselves with regard 
to their respective administrations? Unsurprisingly, 
the new prime minister gained the vote of confidence 
from the NCA two days later.80
 
 
 
 
80  Of 197 voters, 139 votes for, 45 against and 13 absten-
tions. See details on: http://www.marsad.tn/fr/votes/ 
5140a679b197de08259e599d (accessed August 5, 2013). 
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Which rules for which transition? 
 
On 13 March, a young street vendor from Tunis who 
had been regularly harassed by officials and police 
died after setting himself on fire. Of great impact, 
this tragedy was further amplified by the fact that it 
brought back memories of the self-immolation of 
another street vendor, in 2010, which had triggered 
the revolution. The simultaneity of this event with the 
vote of confidence accorded to the new government 
then generated a political malaise that characterized 
the ambivalence and uncertain trajectory of the 
Tunisian transition. 
To reassure national and international opinion, the 
new prime minister declared in his inaugural address 
to the NCA that his government would end in Decem-
ber 2013. Soon thereafter, reframing the statements of 
the new head of government, Ghannouchi declared in 
a broadcast statement: “Failure to hold elections by 
the end of 2013 will not lead to the dissolution of the 
different powers.” It is this incongruence that explains 
the refusal of Minister of Defense Zbidi to continue his 
office for another term in the Larayedh government, 
citing as reasons the absence of an electoral calendar 
and the exhaustion of the army by maintaining the 
country in a state of emergency since January 2011. 
The same can be said of the sensational resignation 
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rachid 
Ammar, on 24 June 2013, the anniversary of the 
creation of the Tunisian army. The famous general, 
who maintained that “the assassination of Belaid 
marks the death of the Troika government” and who 
refused the offer given him by Larayedh to occupy the 
position of minister of defense, resigned three months 
after the departure of his ally Zbidi, stressing his sup-
port of the initiative for a non-partisan government.81
 
81  The video can be viewed at: http://directinfo. 
webmanagercenter.com/2013/06/25/video-le-general-ammar-
invite-de-la-chaine-ettounsiya-tv/ (accessed August 5, 2013). 
 
The resignation of General Ammar occurred in the 
wake of a campaign that had been orchestrated many 
months prior. Two events underline this. One, back 
when the proposal to form a non-partisan govern-
ment was launched, the Secretary General of the CPR, 
Mohamed Abbou, threatened to “bring to justice all 
those who call for the intervention of the army into 
politics,” yet then came back to demand four months 
later, this time under his new label of “dissident,” 
the resignation of Ammar. Neither the President of 
the Republic (who is also Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces) nor the Prime Minister nor the new 
Minister of Defense came to the defense of Amman. 
It should be noted that at that very point in time, the 
army, cut off from intelligent services, was severely 
challenged by the jihadist hideout that had been able 
to take roots in light of the passivity of the paramili-
tary corps of forest rangers (falling under the Ministry 
of Agriculture) on Mount Chaambi, on the border with 
Algeria. It is these circumstances that pushed General 
Ammar to go into retirement.82 The statements made 
by Mohamed Abbou, the unfailing ally of the Ennahda 
hardliners, echoed those made in petto one year prior 
by Ghannouchi, during his famous filmed discussion 
with the Salafists: “The army, still under control of the 
secular elites, is not [yet] ours.”83
Between political violence and exclusion: 
Which rules apply to which game? 
 
Beyond the electoral calendar, the absence of which 
maintained imprecision and incertitude as to the 
political transition in Tunisia, a further issue of major 
importance, though little discussed, surfaced: the 
question concerning the quality of elections. The 
dominant paradigm of transitology, with its main 
focus on the electoral moment, loses sight of the 
institutional background. In other words, the “elec-
toral sophism” that underpins transitology stands in 
the way of identifying the cases, increasingly many, 
where elections, although open, are not necessarily 
democratic. In fact, in hybrid regimes, electoral mani-
pulations, diversion of state resources by the party 
or coalition in power, asymmetrical access to party 
 
82  In this televised intervention, Amman emphasized the 
urgency of implementing a “national intelligence service” 
as an “indispensable [tool] for combating jihadist terrorism.” 
In the Tunisian political regime, intelligence services fall 
under the Ministry of the Interior. 
83  The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=U_2VbocEHYI (accessed August 5, 2013). 
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funding, as well as harassment and violence have 
resulted in producing elections that have been more 
or less competitive but hardly fair.84
The scope of informal practice goes well beyond 
the measures discussed so far. Above all, the contro-
versial role played by the strongly contested LPR in 
the Tunisian political game is inscribed in the frame-
work of this parallel system. Taking shape in the 
beginning of the crisis of the interim government, the 
LPR marked their entry into politics the day after the 
UGTT National Dialogue Conference, which the ruling 
party had boycotted, with the assassination of the 
unionist and Regional Director of the opposition party 
Nidaa Tounes, Lotfi Naguedh. Unpunished, the LPR 
resurfaced on 4 December 2012, the day before the 
agreement was concluded between then-Prime Minis-
ter Jebali and the UGTT, by provoking a conflict in 
front of the headquarters of the historical union 
founded by Farhat Hached. The muscled show of 
militiamen triggered an acute crisis between the gov-
ernment and the national trade union center. Con-
gratulated the following day for serving as a “living 
reminder of the revolution” by Ghannouchi, the LPR 
escaped justice given the backing they were given by 
the hardline partisans from Ennahda. Then-Prime 
Minister Jebali, usurped by his own party, was unable 
to dissolve these violent groups. Although Jebali had 
been calling for the dissolution of the militias since 
mid-December 2012,
 How might the 
present institutional environment fare with regard 
to the upcoming elections in Tunisia? Indeed, in post-
authoritarian transitions, the place of informal insti-
tutions can reveal itself as determining. Thus, the 
institutional crisis that erupted in October 2012 and 
that culminated in February 2013 with the homicide 
of the opponent Belaid appears to confirm the follow-
ing proposition: If a ruling party is unable to reach its 
objectives through the formal institutions, it will 
implement extra-institutional instruments. 
85 Ennahda’s parliamentary 
leader Atig visited the LPR members accused of the 
murder of Naguedh, and the Ennahda constituent Ali 
Fares qualified the deadly assault as “revolutionary,” 
even declaring that he was already working with the 
Ministry of Justice in view of securing amnesty for 
those arrested.86
 
84  Cf. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (see 
note 
 The third brazen action of the LPR 
took place at the height of the crisis of the interim 
4); Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation” (see note 4). 
85  Interview televised on the private Tunisian channel 
Hannibal on February 16, 2012. 
86  See http://www.tanitpresse.tn. 
government. Enjoying police protection, and armed 
with riot clubs, the militia reappeared on 2 February 
2013 – the exact day when Ennahda’s Shura Council 
called on the judicial authority to “end the injustice 
committed against the members of the LPR and 
Ennahda” in the Naguedh affair – and stormed public 
meetings of the opposition parties. Further, some 
hundred LPR militiamen, Salafists and militants from 
Ennahda violently disrupted a meeting of the party Al 
Jomhouri in Kairouan. In the absence of an interven-
tion by government security forces, the offensive 
succeeded to prevent the holding of this public 
meeting that was to be led by the party’s Secretary 
General, Maya Jribi.87 On the same day, the LPR 
militias also committed a violent attack on a public 
meeting held in El Kef by the Popular Front. One 
month after the departure of Minister of Justice Bhiri, 
the examining magistrate of the Court of First 
Instance of Tataouine raised the veil on the matter of 
the assassination of Naguedh. Discrediting the 
account advanced by the Ministry of the Interior, then 
under Larayedh, according to which the deceased 
suffered a heart attack, the examining magistrate laid 
a charge of premeditated murder against the 
defendants, almost all of whom were members of 
Ennahda and commandeered by the head of the LPR 
in Tataouine.88 However, whereas a near-unanimous 
consensus of political society from the radicals of the 
opposition to the moderates of the government 
coalition formed around the necessity of dissolving 
the LPR, Ghannouchi, in an effort to preempt the 
action of the new prime minister, stated on the day of 
the investiture of Jebali’s successor: “They have all the 
right to exist, because it is a legitimate and recognized 
association.”89
 
87  Hassan Ayyadi, “Les LPR confirment qu’elles sont au-desus 
de la Loi, la police fuit sa responsabilité,” Le Maghreb, February 
2, 2013, p. 7. 
 At a time when, given the democratic 
transition, repression came at a cost, were the LPR an 
informal instrument of coercion designed to harass 
the adversaries of the party in power? Everything 
suggests that this was the case, beginning with the 
solid political protection given to these militias by 
Ennahda. How then could these elections be called 
88  Cf. “Assassinat de Lotfi Naguedh: Les LPR reconnues 
coupables,” Radio Express FM, April 5, 2013, http://www. 
radioexpressfm.com/news/show/assassinat-de-lotfi-naguedh-
les-lpr-condamnes (accessed August 6, 2013); read also the 
interview accorded by the Minister of the Interior to the 
journal Le Maghreb, March 20, 2013. 
89  Declarations made on radio Shems FM on March 11, 2013. 
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elections if violent groups, protected by the ruling 
party, were pursuing their intimidations and bloody 
assaults against journalists, partisans, militants and 
candidates of the opposition parties? While such 
elections may be competitive, they can hardly be 
considered fair. 
Does the institution mandated to oversee the elec-
tions have the means of ensuring free and fair 
elections? Or, even more pertinent, why did the rulers 
decide to institute a new electoral body while the one 
that oversaw the 2011 elections was globally recog-
nized for having accomplished the first free and 
democratic elections in the history of Tunisia? What 
is the logic behind the creation of a permanent insti-
tution while all the institutions in place are interim? 
Why would one do without an institution having 
accumulated valuable experience and knowledge 
when the monitoring of elections demands exactly 
these assets? Why did the winners of the first round 
of the transition wanted to change of referee at half-
time? Was ISIE President Kamel Jendoubi too inde-
pendent in the eyes of the hardliners of the party 
in power? The latter, after having failed to co-opt 
Jendoubi,90 announced on the day before the October 
2012 National Dialogue Conference that they would 
not support the reinstatement of the principal archi-
tect of the 2011 election as head of the new electoral 
oversight body. Was there a link between that veto 
and the orchestrated media attack against the highly 
respected Jendoubi? There can be little doubt in light 
of the fact that the person behind the campaign was a 
lawyer dedicated to the ruling party.91
In fact, the bill relating to the ISIE proposed by 
Ennahda turned out to be entirely structured around 
the distancing of the exiting ISIE President Jendoubi 
and the weakening of the electoral oversight body. 
Adopted on 12 December 2012 – during the boycott 
 
 
90  At a press conference held on May 23, 2013 in Tunis, 
Jendoubi announced having refused the offers of Ennahda to 
enter into the government or to occupy a position of ambas-
sador. Ennahda did not deny this announcement afterwards. 
“Après avoir cherché à le soudoyer, Kamel Jendoubi devient 
l’homme à abattre,” BusinessNews.com.tn, May 24, 2013, 
http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Après-avoir-
cherché-à-le-soudoyer,-Kamel-Jendoubi-devient-lhomme-à-
abattre-,519,38312,3 (accessed August 6, 2013). 
91  Kamel Layouni hosted a popular meeting of the ruling 
party in Sidi Bousaïd on January 24, 2013 in the company 
of Atig. Direct observation. Layouni is the lawyer of Rafik 
Bouchlaka, son-in-law of Ghannouchi and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the Jebali government (from December 2011 to 
February 2013). 
of the NCA by the deputies of the democratic bloc92 to 
denounce the police brutality deployed in Siliana – 
the law instituting the new ISIE in fact weakened the 
election oversight body much more than it strength-
ened it.93
Other factors, no less important, sustain the doubts 
on the proper conduct of the next elections. The Draft 
Law on the Political Immunization of the Revolution 
is one of them. Submitted by the hardliners of Ennah-
da and the CPR at the beginning of the crisis of the 
interim institutions, the instrument aims to exclude 
from electoral competition whom the document calls 
the “influential actors of the former regime” having 
exercised functions within the state and the ruling 
party (the Rassemblement constitutionnel démo-
cratique, RCD) between 2 April 1989 and 14 January 
2011.
 The new institution is composed of an exec-
utive body and a council directed by the president of 
the ISIE. However, while the law attributes extensive 
prerogatives to the head of the executive body, it 
remains silent on those of the president of the council. 
It is, however, the latter and not the director of the 
executive body who has the responsibility for the 
electoral oversight body. This organization of power 
with two heads bears a risk of internal conflict and 
deadlock. That threat is all the greater in that the 
members of the ISIE are elected by the NCA, whose 
criteria had been rejected a first time by the adminis-
trative court in mid-May 2013 for discrimination and 
non-respect of equal opportunity. The law does not 
grant financial independence to the electoral body, 
nor does it ensure its independence with regard to the 
authorities, with Article 22 designating the govern-
ment as the intermediary between the ISIE and the 
administration. There is little hope that such an insti-
tution can stand up against an administration sus-
pected, not without good reason, of politicization in 
order to control the financing of parties, to prohibit 
the use of mosques for political purposes, to mobilize 
the government against the militias, in short, to 
create the conditions for holding fully democratic 
elections. 
94
 
92  The democratic bloc then included some thirty deputies 
mainly from Al Joumhouri, Al Massar and the Alliance démo-
cratique. 
 Tabled by the hardline partisans soon after the 
call of Nidaa Tounes to transition to “consensual legiti-
93  The law can be consulted on the official website of the 
ANC: http://www.anc.tn. 
94  The period begins five days before the “coup d’État 
médical” orchestrated by General Ben Ali and ends with 
the departure of the autocrat. 
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macy,” the bill, if enacted, would produce a long list 
of people to exclude for ten years from electoral and 
institutional politics, including the candidature for 
presidential, legislative and municipal elections, the 
direction of the government or ministries, and the 
chairing of or belonging to a founding committee of 
a political party.95 The exclusion also targets those 
who had been candidates on the lists of the ruling 
party of the former regime at the People’s Assembly 
(the parliament). Essebsi, for example, who had 
chaired parliament from 1990 to 1991, is a perfect fit 
for these criteria of political exclusion. The intention 
of the Nidaa Tounes president and main adversary of 
both Ennahda and the CPR96 to announce his candi-
dature for the presidential election was widely known. 
But the list, which spans the position of prime minis-
ter to candidates on the lists of the RCD in the munic-
ipal elections, would essentially ban thousands of 
people from political activity. According to Human 
Rights Watch: “The proposed law’s provisions and pro-
cedures for exclusion amount to an unnecessary and 
disproportionate restriction on political rights. [...] 
This sweeping law automatically excludes people, 
depriving them from fundamental political rights, 
without a real chance to rebut the claims against 
them.”97
 
95  Article 3 of the Draft Law on the Political Immunization 
of the Revolution. 
 More troubling, Article 4 of the Draft Law on 
the Political Immunization of the Revolution clearly 
opens the door to denunciation. In case of adoption, 
the instrument of political exclusion would put Tuni-
sia, a member state of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, in violation of its inter-
national commitments. Whereas a near-unanimous 
consensus, spanning from the extreme left revolu-
tionary Hamma Hammami to the liberal Islamist 
Ennahda Dilou, condemned the bill, the radicals, who 
are pulling the strings of the Shura Council, have been 
urging the Ennahda bloc at the NCA to accelerate its 
96  According to an opinion poll on voter intentions con-
ducted by the firm 3C Etudes in October 2012, Nidaa Tounes 
ranked in second place at the legislative with 28.1% (Ennahda 
first with 30.9%) and Essebsi ranked in first place for the 
presidential election with 14% (Marzouki in second place 
with 9.7%). Read: “Baromètre politique 3C Etudes,” Institut 
3C Etudes, October 18, 2012, http://blog.3cetudes.com/2012/ 
10/18/barometre-politique-3c-etudes-vague-10-octobre-2012/ 
(accessed August 6, 2013). 
97  “Tunisie: Une loi d’exclusion politique très large,” Human 
Rights Watch, June 15, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/ 
2013/06/15/tunisie-une-loi-d-exclusion-politique-tres-large# 
(accessed August 12, 2013). 
adoption. The European tour during which former 
prime minister Jebali declared his opposition to the 
law of exclusion on the waves of BBC and in the daily 
Al Sharq Al Awsat98 in mid-May 2013 did not have an 
impact at home. Nor could that be said of the leftist 
intellectual Aziz Krichen, member of the moderate 
wing of the CPR and political adviser to President 
Marzouki, who affirmed on 22 March 2013 on the 
French television channel France 24 that “the Draft 
Law on Political Exclusion will not be passed.”99 Won 
over by the hardline partisans, the ruling party has 
seemed, with the backing of the CPR and the armed 
support of the LPR,100 well determined to get this bill 
passed.101
 
98  Al Sharq Al Awsat, May 16, 2013. 
 Yet, with such an instrument of political 
exclusion, elections would be even less democratic. 
This applies even more insofar as the bill burdens the 
ISIE, a body with little financial autonomy, with the 
99  The video can be viewed at: http://www.france24.com/fr/ 
20130321-lentretien-aziz-krichen-bourguiba-printemps-arabe-
transition (accessed August 6, 2013). 
100  Even though not very numerous, the LPR groups, who 
effected a sit-in before the National Constituent Assembly 
on June 27, 2013 to demand the adoption of the Draft Law 
on the Political Immunization of the Revolution on the day 
when it was debated in the plenary, assaulted many journal-
ists and threatened a constituent opposed to the political 
exclusion measure. Read the article (in Arabic) at http://www. 
assabah.com.tn/article-91643.html (accessed August 26, 2013). 
101  The vote on the closing of the general debate on the 
Draft Law on the Political Immunization of the Revolution, 
effected on June 28, 2013, was as follows: 96 for, 38 against, 
3 abstentions. Of the favorable votes, 74 were from the 
Ennahda bloc, 10 from the CPR, 4 from Ettakatol, 7 inde-
pendents and 1 from the Democrats. Of the votes against, 
22 were from the Democrats and 16 independent. The 
abstentions were: two independent and one from Ettakatol 
(the Second Vice President of the NCA, who chaired the 
session on that day). For more details on the vote, visit the 
website of the Marsad observatory: http://www.marsad.tn/fr/ 
votes/51cd934b7ea2c47c3f3672c7 (accessed August 6, 2013). 
One surprising outcome of this vote was the about-turn of 
Ettakatol, the party that had before expressed that the “tran-
sitional justice is the only means of immunizing the revolu-
tion.” By this vote, Ettakatol, which, contrary to CPR, showed 
itself to be satisfied with the draft constitution, seemed to 
augur an alliance with Ennahda for the coming presidential 
election. President Marzouki waited until the day following 
the vote to express his refusal, in the pre-electoral context, 
of the Draft Law on the Political Immunization of the Revo-
lution. The video can be viewed at: http://www.businessnews. 
com.tn/Tunisie---L’interview-consensuelle-accordée-par-
Moncef-Marzouki-à-Iyadh-Ben-Achour-(Vidéo),520,39038,3 
(accessed August 6, 2013). 
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heavy task of establishing a preliminary list of the 
people targeted by the privation of political rights.102
Which constitution for which community? 
 
Analyzing the constitutional set-up in its political 
and institutional environment allows to better under-
stand the lines of conflict that inhibit the process of 
drafting the constitution. These lines of conflict can 
be grouped into two categories, one concerning the 
polity and the other the political regime. 
 
The first line of conflict concerns the polity. Whereas a gen-
eral consensus on the subject of the political commu-
nity seemed to unfold during the campaign for the 
election of the Constituent Assembly, Ennahda’s deci-
sion to turn the sharia into one of the foundations of 
the constitution – an objective which the party had 
not mentioned in its electoral program – provoked a 
wave of outrage, the first since the founding elections 
of October 2011. In fact, many wondered whether a 
religious counter-revolution had been underway since 
the democratic accession of Ennahda to power. The 
demands for the “constitutionalization of the sharia,” 
for the “criminalization of offences against sacred 
values” and for the upholding of the “principle of 
‘complementarity’ of women to men” cast doubt not 
only on the “moderation” so readily attributed to the 
Ennahda Movement; it also ended up threatening the 
Troika by exacerbating the ideological polarization 
between its partners. Ben Jaafar, who made of the civil 
state a “red line not to be trespassed,” threatened to 
leave the coalition if the Islamist party did not with-
draw the clause concerning the sharia. Before the 
strong mobilization of Tunisian civil society, the 
threat of defection of the secular ally, and the taint-
ing of the party’s image with Western leaders, the 
Ennahda Shura Council complied and Ghannouchi 
announced in March 2012 that the party had aban-
doned the constitutionalization of the sharia. By 
ceding with regard to the sharia, the Islamist party 
demonstrated “pragmatism,” and, perhaps more im-
portantly, also gained a considerable compensation 
from the secularists in return: the non-constitution-
alization of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.103
 
102  Article 4 of the bill. 
 The preamble of the draft constitution, 
103  Interview with the dissident Ettakatol constituents 
Mabrouk and Ben Abdesselam, Tunis, January 2013. 
which has not changed much between the first draft 
from August 2012 and the draft from April 2013, 
states: “We, the elected officials of the Tunisian people 
[…], based on the constants of Islam […], the universal 
principles of man and their compatibility with the 
cultural specificities of the Tunisian people […].”104 
The compromise reached revealed itself to be much 
weaker than the agreement achieved by the famous 
“Collectif du 18 octobre 2005,” in which certain 
Ennahda members, then in hiding, following the 
example of Dilou, engaged themselves, alongside 
secularist opponents such as Chebbi and Hammami, 
in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.105 Thus, by limiting the scope of validity of 
universal human rights with two imperatives – the 
“constants of Islam” and the “cultural specificities of 
the Tunisian people,” – the draft constitution became 
ambivalent to say the least. The deafening silence sur-
rounding the freedom of conscience increased this 
ambiguity. Subjected to the pressure exercised by 
lawyers such as Ben Achour as well as by civil society 
associations and forums, the drafting and coordina-
tion committee that supervised the drafting of the 
constitution106 then removed this ambiguity, at least 
partially. The draft constitution of 1 June 2013,107 on 
which the Assembly was later called on to vote, con-
tained a notable change: The writer had replaced the 
expression “the constants of Islam” with the more 
open “teachings of Islam” and removed the contro-
versial passage stipulating “compatibility with the 
cultural specificities of the Tunisian people.”108
The ambivalence relative to the hierarchy of the 
values adopted by the constitution was, however, 
removed only partially. A major obstacle remained: 
the one concerning the relations between religion 
and the state. The Islamist movement, which had 
ceded on the “constitutionalization of the sharia” and 
on the “criminalization of blasphemy,” became once 
again in charge by stipulating in Article 140 of the 
draft constitution that no constitutional reform could 
 
 
104  The draft constitution of April 2013 is available on the 
official website of the ANC: http//www.anc.tn. 
105  Read the documents of the “Collectif du 18 octobre 
2005” on http://www.nachaz.org/index.php/fr/textes-a-l-appui/ 
politique/102-2012-09-11-12-11-20.html (accessed August 7, 
2013). 
106  Directed by the president of the NCA. 
107  The draft constitution of 01 June 2013 is available on 
the official website of the ANC: http://www.anc.tn. 
108  The adoption of the constitution requires a two-thirds 
majority. 
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ever question “Islam as the religion of the state.” Thus, 
by attributing a supra-constitutional value to a pro-
vision that was “foreign to Tunisian law as well as to 
the revolution of ‘liberty and dignity’,”109
 
 Ennahda 
removed the secular content from the first two articles 
of the constitutional project, which now stipulate the 
following respectively: “Tunisia is a free, independent 
and sovereign state, its language Arab, its religion 
Islam, its regime the Republic”; “Tunisia is a civil state 
founded on citizenship, the will of the people and the 
supremacy of the law.” Yet, what could the adjective 
“civil” attributed to the state mean if the latter was 
soon thereafter consecrated to religion? The catch-22 
is even more substantial in that Article 5 of the con-
stitutional project designates the state as the “guard-
ian of religion.” Articles 30 and 40 then add to the al-
ready considerable ambiguity by limiting the freedom 
of expression, information and publication with a law, 
flexible on demand, “protecting the rights of others, 
their reputation, safety and health,” and by stipulat-
ing the “imperatives of security, national defense and 
public health.” The response of the Tunisian draft con-
stitution to the fundamental question of the polity – a 
community of believers or citizens? – remains am-
bivalent. 
The second line of conflict concerns the political regime. 
Two antagonistic political formulas have fought for 
supremacy since the beginning of the constitutional 
process, one parliamentary, the other semi-presiden-
tial. Ennahda, in the majority after the founding elec-
tions, advocated a parliamentary regime that would 
not protect against the risk of a ruling-party hegemo-
ny. By contrast, the opposition and the CPR of Presi-
dent Marzouki, who hoped that one or the other 
would win the presidential election, pleaded in favor 
of a semi-presidentialism similar to that of the 5th 
French Republic. In this system, widespread in the 
world, in particular since the fall of Communism,110
 
109  Interview with Ben Achour, Tunis, February 2013. 
 
the president of the republic, elected by universal 
suffrage, has considerable prerogatives, such as the 
dissolution of parliament, recourse to referendums, 
the conduct of foreign affairs and defense, while the 
prime minister, in power due to the parliamentary 
majority, develops the general policies of government. 
The blockage generated by this antagonism paralyzed 
the works of the constitutional committee mandated 
110  Cindy Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs (Princeton, 
2005), p. 120. 
to define the prerogatives of the two poles of the exec-
utive.111 While said committee voted in favor of the 
formula of a semi-presidential regime,112
 
111  From the start, Marzouki, President of the Interim 
Republic, tried to put a loyal partisan, Omar Chetoui, at the 
head of this Constitutional Committee. Supported by the 
opposition, the latter revealed himself to be a formidable 
adversary of Ennahda on this very crucial institutional ques-
tion. The author was able to attend many closed meetings of 
this Constitutional Committee in January and February 2013. 
 the draft 
constitution of 1 June 2013, strongly influenced by the 
“general coordinator of the constitution,” the hardline 
Ennahda partisan Habib Khedher, prescribes a wholly 
different system of government. In fact, the majority 
party, which had ceded on the principle of universal 
suffrage for the election of the president of the repub-
lic, decided at the same time to considerably limit 
the prerogatives of the chief of state for the benefit of 
those of the prime minister. Article 76 thus specified 
that the president of the republic is to develop the 
policies of foreign affairs and defense “in compliance 
with the general policy of the state.” Thus, the prerog-
atives in Article 76, just as in Article 90, are granted 
exclusively to the prime minister. Moreover, Article 77 
stipulates that the president is able to appoint the 
governor of the central bank “upon recommendation” 
of the prime minister and “after a majority vote” of 
the People’s Assembly. The same article specifies that 
appointments to “higher diplomatic military func-
tions and those relative to national security” attri-
buted to the president of the republic, to be eventually 
defined by a law, are “subjected to the condition of 
non-opposition” of the concerned parliamentary com-
mittee. In addition, while the parliament is able, pur-
suant to Article 87, to impeach the president of the 
republic, although elected by universal suffrage, the 
latter is only mandated to dissolve the People’s Assem-
bly in one specific case: when, following legislative 
elections, the first candidate designated by the presi-
dent to form a government fails to build his or her 
cabinet within four months. Interestingly, the draft 
constitution grants the prime minister the prerogative 
to legislate by decree in case of dissolution of the 
People’s Assembly (Article 64). Thus, in that case, the 
prime minister, no longer holding electoral legiti-
macy, can hardly hope to accomplish more than the 
handling of current affairs. In the end, the political 
112  Participant observation, January 2013. Read the report 
of the President of the Constitutional Committee on the 
Legislative and Executive Powers, Chetoui: http://nawaat.org/ 
portail/2013/07/12/ﺮﻤﻋ-ﻱﻮﺘﺸﻟﺍ-ﺲﻴﺋﺭ-ﺔﻨﺠﻟ-ﻦﻴﺘﻄﻠﺴﻟﺍ-ﻊﻳﺮﺸﺘﻟﺍ/ 
(accessed August 6, 2013). 
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system adopted by the draft constitution took over 
flaws from both the parliamentary and the semi-
presidential regime: ruling-party hegemony, parlia-
mentary dictatorship, government volatility, insti-
tutional blockage, presidentialism. 
These shortcomings are all the more serious in 
that the draft constitution does not present sufficient 
guarantees for the independence of the judiciary. Two 
institutional arrangements, among others, exacerbate 
the characteristics of this political formula. One, while 
the practice of the Troika government sanctioned the 
subordination of judges, the draft constitution does 
not foresee institutional guarantees for the public 
prosecution authorities’ independence from the Minis-
try of Justice (in Article 112). Two, while half of the 
Superior Council of the Judiciary, the body mandated 
to oversee the independence of the judiciary (Article 
111), is composed of members who are appointed and, 
above all, foreign to the body of judges, the other half 
is composed of elected and appointed judges (Article 
109). Also, more than half of the Superior Council of 
the Magistrature is composed of designated members. 
Last but not least, the “transitory provisions” of the 
draft constitution were written by Khedher, the Rap-
porteur of the Constitution.113
 
113  “Iyadh Ben Achour: Les dispositions transitoires dans 
leur version actuelle se réfèrent à une nouvelle science in-
ventée par Habib Khedhr,” Radio Mosaïque FM, June 11, 2013, 
http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/ 
22314-iyadh-ben-achour-les-dispositions-transitoires-dans-leur-
version-actuelle-se-referent-a-une-nouvelle-science-inventee-
par-habib-khedhr (accessed August 7, 2013). 
 Tightening the screws 
of the political formula, Article 146 stipulates the 
following: the “gradual” entry in effect of the Con-
stitution; the non-application of the principle of 
recourse to the Constitutional Court to verify the 
constitutionality of laws during its three first years; 
and the opportunity accorded to the NCA to set 
up institutions and to legislate during the period 
between the adoption of the constitution and the 
elections of the People’s Assembly. These institutional 
arrangements distort ex post the approach adopted 
ex ante by the ruling party in view of extending the 
interim period to a maximum. This approach in-
cluded: the refusal to set a temporal limit of the NCA 
in “the provisional organization of the public powers”; 
the refusal to commit to a precise road map and bind-
ing electoral agenda; the distancing of the ISIE, and its 
replacement by a new, less independent entity; the 
weighing down of the process of drafting of the con-
stitution; and the protection of the LPR militias. 
Intensely problematic, the provisions of Article 146 
amplify the already considerable ambiguity and 
imprecision surrounding not only the duration but 
also, if not above all, the type of political transition. 
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Conclusions: Which trajectories for which transition? 
 
The shock wave provoked in Egypt by the popular anti-
Islamist mobilization of 30 June 2013 and the removal 
from power of President Mohamed Morsi by the army, 
three days later, did not fail to shake up Tunisia. Fore-
seeably, the specter of the institutional collapse re-
vealed itself all the more threatening in that the coun-
try had been sliding into a severe crisis of the interim 
government since October 2012. Occurring while the 
transition was bogged down in a dangerous impasse, 
the jolt caused by the bloody crisis that tore Egypt 
apart ended up, by backfiring, exacerbating a process 
of radicalization that had been well underway since 
the devising of the political exclusion instrument and 
the feat of strength perpetrated in accomplishing the 
draft constitution. A dangerous power struggle has 
since begun between the hardline partisans of the 
government party and the radicals of the opposition. 
The affinities between the more radical Ennahda 
elements and the Muslim Brotherhood are not only 
ideological, they are also political. From the inaugural 
show of strength consisting of granting the NCA an 
unlimited mandate to the manipulation of the draft 
constitution, from the infiltration of the public 
administration by partisans to the mass firings of 
judges, from the impunity of police brutality to the 
protection of militias, from the scuttling of the first 
National Dialogue Conference to the sabotaging of 
the non-partisan government, the politics by Ennahda 
seriously undermined the effort of reaching the pro-
cedural consensus so indispensable for the foundation 
of democracy in Tunisia. Troubled and struck by panic 
by the fall of the Islamist government ally in Egypt, 
Ennahda’s dominant hardliners opted for a flight 
forward and escalation. They also crossed yet another 
threshold: that of death threats. The mass meeting 
they held on 13 July in Tunis before some six thou-
sand people in the name of giving “support to the 
legitimacy of President Morsi” marked a new turning 
point in the crisis. Atig threatened any Tunisians 
who might be tempted by dissidence as follows: “Tuni-
sia will be authorized to cause bloodshed on all those 
who trample on its legitimacy”.114
 
114  The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=ROpl77OtY8Y (accessed August 6, 2013). 
 The opposition, 
won over by the radicalization, called for the for-
mation of a “national salvation government.” 
It is in this very tense context that the assassina-
tion of the deputy and member of the Popular Front, 
the Arab nationalist from the left Mohamed Brahmi, 
took place on 25 July, by a hail of bullets in front of 
his home. The moment of the homicide of this deter-
mined opponent of Ennahda, a follower as it so 
happens of Hamedine Sabahi (one of the artisans of 
the fall of the government of the Muslim Brother-
hood),115
Overall, the crisis of the interim institutions was 
the result of a gradual deterioration of the Tunisian 
political climate rather than a sudden outbreak of ten-
sions. Tunisia, which achieved neither the “success of 
the democratic transition” nor the accomplishment 
of the “religious counter-revolution,” finds itself more 
than ever at a crossroads. The Tunisian trajectory, 
uncompleted and uncertain, still has many un-
knowns. Three scenarios take shape on the horizon: 
 was no coincidence: It occurred the day 
before a popular uprising for which both, the chief of 
the Egyptian army and the organization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, had called. The bloodbath that predicta-
bly ensued, receiving global press coverage, could have 
relegated the Tunisian crisis to a secondary priority. 
However, far from letting loose, the power struggle 
between the hardline partisans of the government and 
the radicals of the opposition became fiercer. While 
the former defended the status quo, pointing to the 
terrorism that had killed, four days after the assassi-
nation of Brahmi, ten soldiers on Mount Chaambi, the 
latter, blaming the Troika government for the erup-
tion of political violence and the weakening of the 
state, called for the “dissolution of the NCA” and the 
formation of a “national salvation government.” 
 
 Political instability. The exacerbation of the power 
struggle between the hardline partisans of the gov-
ernment and the radicals of the opposition favors 
this fall into the unknown. Two irreconcilable 
rationales feed this crisis: the status quo on the one 
side and tabula rasa on the other. The confrontation 
of the two approaches could well, as in Egypt, 
 
115  Interview with the author, Tunis, January–February 2013. 
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divide the country into two opposing camps: the 
hardliners of Ennahda on the one side and the 
Union for Tunisia (an alliance between secularist 
political parties formed in January 2013 between, 
among others, Nidaa Tounes, Al-Joumhoury and 
Al-Massar) and the Popular Front on the other, the 
latter two having worked toward a rapprochement 
since Ennahda decided to implement the instru-
ment of political exclusion and to show force in the 
drafting of the draft constitution. Politically dan-
gerous, economically ruinous and socially untena-
ble, this scenario could lead to a second revolution, 
a second transition or a new form of authoritarian-
ism. 
 Emergence of a competitive authoritarian regime. The 
hardline partisans of Ennahda and their allies, 
who envision no alternation of power, are building 
among others on the control of the government 
and the administration, the stymieing of the pro-
cess of adopting a constitution, the enactment of 
the Draft Law on Political Exclusion, the implemen-
tation of an advantageous electoral law, the up-
surge of the LPR militias and electoral defection. 
The degree to which this type of hybrid regime 
could be realized depends on the tenacity of civil 
society and the opposition as well as the support 
of the big powers. 
 Democratization. The national consensus, defended 
by the moderates of the opposition and the govern-
ment coalition as well as by the social partners and 
civil society actors, is the only one capable of reduc-
ing the conflict and of stabilizing the new institu-
tions. The chances for democratization in Tunisia 
depend on a historical compromise based on: the 
formation of a non-partisan government; an agree-
ment on the legal aspects of the constitution; the 
abandoning of the instrument of political exclusion 
for the benefit of the implementation of transition-
al justice; an agreement on the electoral law; the 
dissolution of the militias; and the holding of free 
and fair elections before the end of the first quarter 
of 2014. A consolidation of the emerging democra-
cy, a lengthy and reversible process, would then 
depend on additional institutional factors, such as 
the existence of a constitutional state, the separa-
tion of powers, the protection of individual and 
public liberties, the institutionalization of a strong 
party system, the electoral production of majorities, 
the election of presidents coming from the party 
system and integrated in the latter. 
 
In order to prevent the concretization of the first two 
scenarios, German and other European politicians 
should convince their Tunisian counterparts to resolve 
the current institutional and governmental crisis by 
means of the following measures: 
 Form a non-partisan government mandated to 
handle current affairs and to organize, within the 
shortest delay possible, transparent, free and fair 
elections in which its members, figures recognized 
for their competence and integrity, will not take 
part; 
 Reactivate with urgency the National Dialogue 
Conference of the UGTT in order to arrive at a pro-
cedural consensus between the different parties on 
the regulations of the political game (constitution, 
political agenda, electoral law, violence, etc.); 
 Resume the work of the NCA in order to complete, 
before the symbolic date of 23 October 2013, the 
most urgent tasks of the transition, such as the 
adoption of a draft constitution and of an electoral 
law; 
 Implement an independent commission mandated 
to shed light on the sponsors of political homicides 
of Belaid and Brahmi, and publish a report thereon 
before the end of the year; 
 End the political interference into the judiciary 
by the government; 
 Reexamine the administrative appointments 
effected by the preceding government; 
 Strengthen the institutional independence of 
the new ISIE; 
 Fix a binding electoral calendar for the holding of 
elections before the end of the first quarter of 2014; 
ensure a heightened international electoral sur-
veillance; 
 Accelerate the adoption of the Draft Law on Tran-
sitional Justice and abandon the Draft Law on 
Political Exclusion; 
 Dissolve the militias and bring to justice their 
members involved in acts of violence; 
 Prohibit the use of mosques, schools and public 
administrations for political or partisan purposes. 
